Two Essays in Financial Economics by Malhotra, Jatin Ravikant
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
University of New Orleans Theses and 
Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
Summer 8-2-2012 
Two Essays in Financial Economics 
Jatin Ravikant Malhotra 
jmalhotr@uno.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Malhotra, Jatin Ravikant, "Two Essays in Financial Economics" (2012). University of New Orleans Theses 
and Dissertations. 1529. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1529 
This Dissertation-Restricted is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by 
ScholarWorks@UNO with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation-Restricted in 
any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you 
need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative 
Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation-Restricted has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations 
by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@uno.edu. 
Two Essays in Financial Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
                            
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of New Orleans 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
In 
Financial Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Jatin Ravikant Malhotra  
 
B.Com. University of Mumbai, 2002 
M.B.A. University of Mumbai, 2005 
M.Sc. State University of New York at Buffalo, 2008 
M.Sc. University of New Orleans, 2010 
 
August, 2012 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2012, Jatin Ravikant Malhotra 
iii 
 
Dedication 
 
 
For my father, Ravikant Malhotra for being the pillar of the family. 
 
For my mother, Meenu Malhotra who encouraged me to pursue higher education and to dream 
big. 
 
For my aunt, Manjula Vij who made my life easier during the entire course. 
 
For my sisters and brothers and my family who always supported me. 
 
For my friends who are the best company one can have. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
 
This research has reached this point because of the help and patience of many people to 
whom I like to extend the deepest appreciation and thanks. I am thankful to my loving and 
supporting family. I would not be the person I am today without them. 
 
I owe a great deal of thanks to the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Peihwang Wei 
for agreeing to supervise my work. He has earned my special gratitude and respect for his deep 
knowledge of the subject matter and the extended hours he spent to make me a better researcher. 
I will be indebted to him for the rest of my life. I would also like to thank my dissertation 
committee members, Dr. Tarun Mukherjee, Dr. Gerald Whitney, Dr. M. Kabir Hassan and Dr. 
Atsuyuki Naka for their valuable comments and suggestions that made this dissertation much 
better. Many thanks to all faculty members at the Department of Economics and Finance from 
whom I learned much.  
 
Special thanks to Dr. Walter Lane, the Chair of the Department of Economics and 
Finance, for his continuous support throughout my life as a PhD student at the University of New 
Orleans. Many thanks to Russell Holliday, former Administrative Executive of the Department. 
His supportive attitude and extreme kindness cannot be forgotten. Finally, I like to thank all 
students and alumni of the PhD program for all the support and nice times we spent together. 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... vi 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. vii 
CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................................1 
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1 
2. Literature Review .....................................................................................................................4 
2.1 Literature review on Compensation and Diversification ....................................................4 
2.2 Literature review on Compensation and Firm Risk ...........................................................8 
3. Variables and Methodology ...................................................................................................12 
4. Empirical Results ...................................................................................................................20 
5. Robustness Check ..................................................................................................................27 
6. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................33 
References ..................................................................................................................................34 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................................38 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................38 
2. Literature Review ...................................................................................................................42 
2.1 Price Discovery ................................................................................................................42 
2.2 Market Microstructure ......................................................................................................45 
3. Data ........................................................................................................................................48 
3.1 Futures Market Data .........................................................................................................48 
3.2 Futures Positioning Data ..................................................................................................51 
4. Methodology and Results .......................................................................................................55 
4.1 Information Sharing Approach .........................................................................................55 
4.2 Common Factor Component Weight Approach ...............................................................61 
5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................66 
References ..................................................................................................................................67 
APPENDICES ..............................................................................................................................73 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................73 
VITA..............................................................................................................................................76 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Chapter 1 
 
Table 1 – Definition of Variables ..................................................................................................14 
Table 2 – Summary Statistics ........................................................................................................17 
Table 3 – Correlation among independent variables .....................................................................19 
Table 4 – Regression results of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging, 
                interaction variable and control variables including size and debt ................................21 
Table 5 - Regression results of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging,  
                interaction variable and control variables excluding size and debt ...............................24 
Table 6 - Regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on lags of diversification, hedging, 
                interaction variable and control variables including size and debt ................................26 
Table 7 - Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification,  
               hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. .................29 
Table 8 - Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification,  
               hedging, interaction variable and control variables excluding size and debt .................31 
Chapter 2 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics ........................................................................................................50 
Table 2 - Summary statistics of Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) positioning  
               data ..................................................................................................................................53 
Table 3 - Information Shares (IS) ..................................................................................................58 
Table 4 – Effects of trader position on information share using Hasbrouck (1995) ......................60 
Table 5 - Information share: Gonzalo – Granger weights .............................................................63 
Table 6 - Effects of trader‟s positions on information share using Gonzalo – Granger (1995)  ...64 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between hedging and 
diversification effects on CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. 
The REIT industry is suitable for this investigation for various reasons; primarily being that the 
REIT sample represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and 
hedging on compensations. I find a positive and significant relationship between the interaction 
variable which reflects the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity. This is consistent with the notion that managers are in a better position 
to manage firm risk if they use all the available tools and instruments, including hedging and 
diversification. I also find a positive and significant relationship between hedging and CEO pay-
for-performance sensitivity, indicating that CEO compensation is more short term oriented 
because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy. 
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the relative contribution of regular and 
e-mini futures market to price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts on the CME, using 
intraday data in 2010.  The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the 
information share approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
Empirical findings indicate that regular futures market accounts for approximately 66.5% of 
price discovery in the EURO/USD market. This study also examines if the regular future’s 
information share (IS) can be explained by the positioning of commercial and non-commercial 
traders. The results support the conclusion that the IS of regular futures can be better explained 
by non-commercial traders (speculators) than commercial traders (hedgers). 
 
Key words: Compensation, diversification, hedging, interaction, Informativeness, trader type, 
REI
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Chapter 1: How is Executive Compensation Related to Hedging and Diversification? The 
Case of REITS 
 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this paper, I examine the relationship between hedging and diversification effects on 
CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. Because both 
diversification and hedging can be used to control risk, it is safe to say that they are substitutes to 
some extent as a tool to control risk. Managers are in a better position to manage firm risk if they 
use all the available tools and instruments, including hedging and diversification. Hence CEOs 
should receive compensation based on the general risk level of the firm which is better reflected 
by both diversification and hedging. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study 
that simultaneously examines compensation, hedging and diversification. 
 
 More specifically, I examine how CEO compensation (CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity) is related to hedging, diversification and the interaction between hedging and 
diversification. I expect that compensation to be significantly related to the interaction between 
hedging and diversification. I also expect differential impacts of hedging and diversification on 
compensation. If compensation is more long term (short term) oriented, then diversification 
(hedging) should be more significantly related to compensation because diversification (hedging) 
is a relatively long term (short term) risk reduction strategy. 
 
 Previous studies by Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Stulz (1990), Gibbson and Murphy (1992), Paul (1992), 
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Lemmon and Wang (1996) and others find mixed results concerning the relation between 
compensation and diversification. Regarding hedging, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Tufano (1996), 
Schrand and Unal (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Core and Guay (2002), Allayannis 
and Ofek (2001), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Rogers (2002) examine the relationship between 
compensation and hedging and find no conclusive results. This study may provide better 
understanding of the relationship between compensation and overall risk of the firm by 
examining the relationship between compensation to both hedging and diversification and their 
interaction.  
 
 It can be argued that the above analysis between compensation and general risk level of a 
firm can apply to all the industries. Hence, I limit my analysis to Real Estate Investment Trust 
(REIT) industry as it is a relatively cleaner sample due to the following reasons. First, REITs do 
not pay corporate taxes, hence the tax motivations is irrelevant for this industry. Second, a 
maximum of 25% of its income can come from short-term capital gains and speculative 
activities, thus limiting the use of derivatives as a speculating instrument. The probability of the 
use of derivative instruments for speculative purposes cannot be ignored. Bodnar et al. (1995) 
found that 34% of derivative users used them for speculation. Ljungqvist (1994) inferred that 
managers with private information will indulge in speculation. Geczy et al. (2007) found a 
substantial number of firms that use derivatives for speculation. Third, Horng and Wei (1999) 
found that 41% of REITs in their sample use derivatives,  most of which are interest rate swaps. 
Mian (1996) found that many industries use interest rate, currency and commodity derivatives 
simultaneously. If there are different motivations for interest rate derivatives and other 
derivatives, then the results might be ambiguous. Focusing on one industry also allows us to 
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include more detailed data of smaller firms. Fifth, REIT industry is relatively more homogenous 
than other industries and can only diversify by regions or by sectors. In sum, REITs sample 
represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and hedging on 
compensation.  
 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on firm hedging, firm 
focus and CEO compensation. Section 3 details data sources and econometric methodology 
employed. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 provides robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes the analysis.  
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2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I summarize major theories of compensation, diversification and hedging 
and highlight their implications that are relevant to this discussion. I also document some 
empirical evidence. 
  
2.1  Literature Review on Compensation and Diversification 
 
 Early seminal works by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) demonstrate 
that there exist a tradeoff between providing incentives and optimal risk sharing for CEOs and 
shareholders. They conclude that managers make decisions that increase their own utility at the 
cost of decrease in the value of the firm because managers are not full residual claimants. This 
means that there exist principal agent problem where shareholders try to link CEO compensation 
to firm performance. CEOs make diversification decisions that maximize their private benefits.  
 
 Additional evidence given by Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Stulz (1990) conclude that diversification increases 
firm value which in turn increases shareholder value. In addition, there is evidence that suggest 
that CEOs derive private benefits from diversification.  
 
 One type of private benefit that the CEO may derive from diversification, according to 
Gibbson and Murphy (1992) is that diversification may improve CEOs future career prospects. 
They find that CEOs who run more diversified firms are paid more. Their experience in running 
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a diversified firm increases their value perception in the labor market. This value perception is 
important for CEOs who would like to move to bigger firms. CEOs who value perception have 
more stake in diversifying the firm. Similarly, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) conclude that 
managers diversify to increase benefit from power and prestige that comes with the increased 
firm size. They infer that CEOs may be worried about their social status and managing a larger 
more diverse firm may give them a respectable position in society. Roll (1986) introduced the 
concept of hubris where over time manager‟s start to believe more in their capabilities and in 
turn indulge in firm diversification. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers can diversify 
to reduce the risk of their undiversifiable human capital.  
 
 Private benefits of CEO also depend on his capabilities and the resources at his disposal. 
The rational here is demand for managerial input at CEO level is likely to increase with the 
amount of extra load that comes with diversification. Finkelstin and Hambrick (1989) conclude 
that diversification may increase the complexity of CEOs job. Hence CEO of a firm with 
multiple lines of business must evaluate competitive strategies for product lines that may have 
different customers, industry structures and competitors. Managing diverse lines of business may 
require deploying a broad variety of resources and capabilities. This implies positive relationship 
between compensation and diversification and between changes in compensation and changes in 
diversification.  
 
 Other reasons for justifying diversification can be found in rent seeking and managerial 
entrenchment models. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) propose 
that managers would prefer to run more diversified firms because of the higher pay that is 
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associated with managing a more diversified firm and because of the benefits derived from 
“skimming” in the diversified firm. They conclude that if managers can siphon-off firm 
resources, their private benefits increases.  
 
 Another related source of private benefit is entrenchment. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989), who introduced managerial entrenchment theory, diversifying the firm may 
entrench mangers, making it costly for the firm to replace them. Hence if the managers feel that 
their position in the firm is not secure, they diversify more. So if diversification allows managers 
to become more entrenched, managers in the diversified firms will have more power to set their 
compensation. If the manager‟s managerial skill is the main source of link between 
diversification and compensation, incumbent manager‟s who diversify should be rewarded with 
higher compensation. 
 
 To sum up, all the above mentioned theories on the relationship between private benefit 
and firm diversification conclude that there exists a positive relationship between firm 
diversification and increase in private benefits to the CEOs. 
 
 On the other hand, in the study of private benefits, executive compensation can be viewed 
as a partial remedy to the agency problem. Termed as optimal contracting theory, the board 
designs the compensation package to provide CEOs with incentives that maximizes shareholders 
value. Paul (1992) and Lemmon and Wang (1996) demonstrate that when the manger is required 
to allocate effort within a diversified firm, the optimal compensation contract cannot rely on the 
firm‟s stock price to provide proper incentives for principal-agent problem. Using this principal 
7 
 
agent framework, Paul (1992) demonstrates that in case of stock based compensation, managers 
will allocate more effort to project whose cash flows have high variability relative to projects 
whose cash flows have low variability. This behavior is because projects having higher 
variability have a more chance of being profitable which in turn increases the managers stock 
based compensation. Lemmon and Wang (1996) conclude that if managers in diverse firms are 
required to pursue a boarder set of activities, then the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the 
firm stock price should be negatively related to the extent of diversification. They argue that in 
diverse firms, managers cannot focus on the core activities of the firm which may have a 
negative impact on the stock price performance. In summary, under optimal contracting theory, 
there exists negative relationship between stock based compensation and diversification. 
 
 Other diversification literature by Finkelstein and Hambric (1989), Bodnar et al. (1998), 
Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997), Bartlett and Goshal (1989), Bartov et al. (1996), Reeb et al. 
(1998), He and Ng (1998),  Errunza and Senbet (1984), Morck and Yeung (1991), and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) talk about CEO compensation and geographic diversification. These geographic 
diversification arguments prove four testable hypothesis visa vie. (1) CEOs total compensation 
varies directly with geographical diversification. (2) Incentive compensation (pay-for-
performance) varies directly with geographic compensation. (3) Use of market based rather than 
accounting based performance measures in CEO compensation for geographic diversification. 
(4) Marginal geographic diversification varies directly with marginal CEO compensation.  
 
 In contrast to the above empirical evidence, Servaes (1996) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1997) find evidence of less diversification in firms with higher managerial equity ownership. 
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They attribute their findings to agency conflicts in a diversified firm. Related empirical literature 
on negative relationship between stock based compensation and diversification include Anderson 
et al (2000) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) which is consistent with the agency cost theory. 
Anderson et al (2000) analyzed a sample of 199 firms from the year 1985 to 1994 and conclude 
that sensitivity of total CEO pay to stock price performance is negatively related to the measures 
of firm diversification. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) use data on managerial incentives from 
Standard and Poor‟s ExecuComp data set and find that firm performance is increasing in 
incentives and decreasing in diversification. 
 
2.2  Literature Review on Compensation and Firm Risk 
 
 There exists a complex relationship between compensation and firm risk management. 
Manager‟s portfolio structure is considered as a strong determinant of the corporate risk 
management choices. There are two theoretical studies that lay out the groundwork to examine 
the relationship between risk management and CEO compensation given by Stulz (1984) and 
Smith and Stulz (1985). 
 
 Stulz (1984) based his model on the hedging policy of the risk-averse manager in perfect 
markets. Since the manager maximizes his expected utility over his lifetime, the model assumes 
that a compensation contract has been agreed on and that the contract aligns managerial 
incentives with those of the shareholders. Because of the assumption that markets are perfect, 
shareholders are indifferent about hedging risk. Since fluctuations in the underlying commodity 
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value increases the volatility of firm value, managers risk aversion leads to hedge because his 
compensation is a function of the firm value.  
 
 Smith and Stulz (1985) proposed that shareholders can affect managers risk aversion 
decision making by compensation contract. Since manager‟s utility function is concave in 
expected wealth, shareholders can structure the compensation contract in such a way as to 
counteract the effects of risk aversion. They infer that compensation can be structured as a 
convex, concave or linear function of firm value where liner and concave compensation contract 
forces manager‟s utility function to be concave. So if the utility is concave in firm value, then 
manager possesses utility maximizing incentives to reduce risk. To sum up, they find that 
managers can be induced to risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking behavior depending on the 
convexity of the contract.  
 
 Among empirical evidence showcasing relationship between compensation and risk 
management, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find a strong positive correlation between firm percent 
return variance and compensation for a sample of 511 firms. In contrast, Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) find a strong empirical confirmation of principal agent model and conclude that executive 
pay-for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of firm‟s performance. But Core 
and Guay (2002) are of the view that the expected dollar return variance used by Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) as the proxy of risk is incorrect as dollar return variance is a noisy measure of 
firm size. In a model of CEO incentives taken from ExecuComp database from 1992 to 1996 that 
includes market value and risk as separate explanatory variables, Core and Guay (2002) find 
percentage return variance is positively related to compensation. 
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 Schrand and Unal (1998) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) examine if executive stock 
option provides managers with an incentive to invest in risky projects and find evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between the two. Schrand and Unal (1998) examine relationship 
between risk management and managerial security holdings. They find that firms with managers 
who are granted options have higher return than the managers who receive no options. This 
implies that either managers who are given options micromanage their portfolio or invest in risky 
projects. Similarly, for a sample of oil and gas producers for the period 1992 to 1997, Rajgopal 
and Shevlin (2002) examine if the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration 
increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEOs options of return volatility. Overall, their 
results are consistent with employee stock options providing managers with incentives to 
mitigate risk related incentive problems. 
 
 In addition, Tufano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Haushalter (2000), 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Rogers (2002) all study the relationship between managerial 
incentive and firm risk management but fail to find any significant evidence of managerial 
motives determining risk management. 
 
 This study concentrates on the REIT industry. There are basically three types of REITs, 
equity, mortgage and hybrid REIT. Equity REITs mainly invest in real properties such as 
shopping malls, apartments and commercial buildings. Mortgage REITs invest in mortgage 
securities. Equity REITs use derivatives mainly to hedge financing costs, while mortgage REITs 
use hedging to provide better maturity matching as they have gaps between durations of assets 
11 
 
and liabilities. Hybrid REITs are a mixture of the equity REIT and the mortgage REIT and also 
accounts for a small percentage of REITs. These hybrids combine the mortgage investment of 
one with the property management of the other. Congress created REITs in the U.S. in 1960 as a 
way to make investments in large-scale, income-producing real estate accessible to all investors 
in the same way they typically invest otherwise – through the purchase and sale of liquid 
securities. Over half a century, the US real estate investment trust (REIT) industry has become 
an important segment of the US economy and investment markets. US REITs have seen their 
equity market capitalization soar from $90 billion to roughly $200 billion in just the past 10 
years (www.reit.com).  
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3.  VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 CEO compensation, measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), is the dependent 
variable and diversification, hedging and the interaction between diversification and hedging are 
independent variables. The CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as a dollar change in 
CEOs wealth for a given dollar change in shareholders wealth, proposed by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) and later used by Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core and Guay (1999, 2002). CEO wealth 
includes bonuses, restricted stock awards, stock awards and all other compensation (short term 
and long term) excluding salary 
  
Two alternative measurements of diversification are used visa vie Herfindahl indices for 
property type and geographic locations. The variable diversification (DIV) is defined as type * 
region, an interaction variable between focus/type and focus/region. The variable focus/type, is 
computed as the sum of the proportion of a firms assets invested in each of four real estate types 
namely office, warehouse, retail and multifamily usage. Higher levels of concentration by 
property type will lead to higher level of index. This index is 1 if the firm is focused along one 
dimension and is 0.25 if the firm‟s portfolio of properties is equally distributed across all four 
property types. The variable focus/region is computed the same way as focus/type, but here we 
take the proportion of firms assets invested in each of eight real estate regions; New England, 
Middle Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, Mountains, Southwest, South Pacific and North Pacific. 
The concentration variable can vary from one for a geographically focused REIT to 0.125 for 
REIT with holdings equally divided across regions. The variable hedge is the dollar amount of 
interest rate hedge undertaken by the REIT.  
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. One of the main hypotheses that I test in this paper is that the coefficient of the 
interaction variable is positive and significant. The interaction variable is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of one when a firm uses both hedging and diversification as means to 
control overall firm risk and 0 otherwise. This study can potentially provide a clear picture of 
how compensation is related to risk management in a broader sense and a better understanding 
among compensation, diversification and hedging can be achieved. By examining diversification 
and hedging, both risk reduction techniques, the study might help to clarify how risk control 
affects compensation. If compensation is more long term (short term) oriented, then 
diversification (hedging) should be more significantly related to compensation because 
diversification (hedging) is a relatively long term (short term) risk reduction strategy. The data 
for hedging, diversification and interaction variable between hedging and diversification (IV) is 
from Security and Exchange Commission‟s (SEC) EDGAR database.  
 
The control variables are divided into groups namely agency cost (M/B, SELF and INST) 
firm size (SZ), leverage (DEBT and RATING), liquidity (CASH and SUBS) and CEO 
characteristics (age and tenure). All the above control variables are commonly used in the CEO 
and executive compensation literature. I obtain the REIT type data from National Association of 
Real Estate Investment trusts. CEO age, tenure and institution holding (INST) data is from 
SEC‟s EDGAR database (DEF 14A) and define logarithm of the square of returns as a proxy for 
volatility. All the other control variable data is from COMPUSTAT. Table 1 summarizes and 
defines all the variables.  
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TABLE 1: Definition of Variables  
Variable  Variable Description  Source  
Dependent Variable 
  Pay-for-performance  $ change in CEO executive compensation for a $ www.sec.com  
Sensitivity (PPS) change in shareholder wealth 
Financial 
Reports 
  
DEF 14A 
   Independent 
Variables 
  DIV Diversification = Focus/Type * Focus/Region where, www.sec.com  
 
Focus/Type is the sum of squares of proportion of a  
Financial 
Reports 10K 
 
firm‟s assets invested in each of four real estate types: 
 
 
office, warehouse, retail, or Multi-family usage. 
 
   
 
Focus/Region is the sum of squares of proportion of  
 
 
firm‟s assets invested in each of eight real estate  
 
 
 regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, Southeast,  
 
 
Midwest, Mountains, Southwest, South Pacific, and 
 
 
North Pacific. 
 
 HEDGE $ amount of interest rate hedge www.sec.com  
  
Financial 
Reports 10K 
IV 
Interaction Variable. A dummy variable equal to 1 if 
REIT exercise in both hedging and diversification and 0 www.sec.com  
  
Financial 
Reports 10K 
   Control Variables 
  
   Volatility Stock returns square  CRSP 
   Agency Costs 
  M/B Market value of assets/Book value of assets  COMPUSTAT 
SELF A dummy variable: 1 for self-administered REITs COMPUSTAT 
INST Proportion of shares held by institutions www.sec.com  
  
Financial 
Reports 10K 
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Firm Size 
TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
 
SZ The log of market value of assets COMPUSTAT 
   Leverage 
  DEBT Book value of debt COMPUSTAT 
COV Pre-tax income/interest COMPUSTAT 
RATING A dummy variable: 1 if bond rating is BBB or better COMPUSTAT 
   CEO Characteristics 
  AGE CEO age www.sec.com  
TENURE CEO tenure Financial Reports 
  
DEF 14A 
Substitutes/Liquidity 
  CASH Cash Balance/market value of assets COMPUSTAT 
SUBS  Value of preferred stock and convertible bonds COMPUSTAT 
 
Over Market value of assets 
 
   REIT Type 
  TYPE A dummy variable: 1 for Equity REIT, 0 otherwise www.nareit.com  
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Most existing compensation literature uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
to estimate the impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity. To account for outliers and to control 
for heteroskedasticity, median OLS and robust OLS techniques are used. Further, to control for 
firm specific effects, fixed/random effects regression is used to analyze the relationship 1 . The 
following is the regression function that I test in this paper. All the variables are time varying. 
 
tttt
ttttttt
tttttt
returnsInstCEOtenure
CEOageRATINGSUBSCASHCOVDEBTSIZE
BMSELFnVariableInteractioationDiversificHedgeCEOpps
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2
1413 15
1211109876
54321
)log(
)ln(
/
 
 
The sample consists of 155 REITs in 2005, 160 REITs in 2006 and 134 REITs in 2007 
included in COMPUSTAT. Real estate performance is dramatically different for the years 2006 
and 2007 and the differences can provide additional insights for our analysis. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for each of the two years individually. 
 
Table 2 represents summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables. The 
sensitivity of pay to stock price performance averages 29.48 with a median value of 22.19. The 
mean (median) PPS for 2006 is 20.02 (18.58) and for 2007 is 34.65 (32.68), indicating that the 
CEO compensation is more sensitive to the overall firm performance in 2007. The mean 
(median) diversification for the entire sample is 0.38% (0.28%). This mean (median) is 0.40% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1
Median regression, used by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), minimizes the sum of absolute deviations instead of the sum of squared deviations 
so that the precise value of the dependent variable in a median regression matters only in determining whether the observation has a positive or 
negative residual. If the residual is positive or negative, the dependent variable can increase toward infinity (minus infinity) without affecting the 
estimated parameters. Koenker and Bassett (1982) discuss the properties of median regression. Hall and Liebman (1998) use robust regression to 
perform an initial screening based on regression results and eliminate gross outliers, and they use the remaining observations and an iterative 
method that minimizes a weighted sum of squared errors to perform regression. For details on robust regression, see Street et al. (1988)
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables. The sample includes 448 REIT’s, 155 in 2005, 
159 in 2006 and 134 in 2007 and describes mean, median standard deviation and number of observations. Statistics are reported for 
CASH defined as cash balance/market value of assets, CEO age, CEO compensation in USD, CEO tenure, DEBT defined as book 
value of debt/market value of assets, diversification defined as an interaction variable between focus/type and focus/region, INST 
defined as institutional holdings, amount of interest rate hedge in USD, M/B defined as market value of assets/Book value of assets, 
Pay for Performance defined as $ change in executive wealth for 1% change in stock price, COV defined as per tax income/interest, R 
is the returns, SZ defined as log of market value of assets and SUBS defined as value of preferred stock and convertible bonds/market 
value of assets.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
      2005       2006     2007     
Category Obs Mean Median S.D. Obs Mean Median S.D. Obs Mean Median S.D. 
CASH 155 45.43 8.79 93.11 159 45.36 9.34 92.71 134 68.39 17.28 182.57 
CEO Age 155 50.33 50.45 15.14 159 51.39 51 14.74 134 52.14 53 16.53 
CEO Compensation ($) 155 1746479 1264534 1804013 159 1784891 1298125 1804012 134 2505814 1835824 3690565 
CEO Tenure 155 18.55 3.45 8.97 159 18.78 4 8.57 134 7.67 5 7.1 
DEBT 155 0.51 -0.06 0.62 159 0.52 0.49 0.22 134 0.57 0.57 0.25 
Diversification 155 0.41 -0.26 0.68 159 0.4 0.29 0.28 134 0.35 0.27 0.25 
INST 155 0.2 -0.35 0.58 159 0.21 0.2 0.18 134 20.57 0.25 235.04 
Interest Rate Hedge ($) 155 110038 876 481868 159 105345 877 481868 134 79459 0 163019 
M/B 155 1.32 0.62 0.72 159 1.26 1.17 0.32 134 1.28 1.12 1.38 
Pay for Performance (PPS) 155 21.44 18.03 2.13 159 20.02 18.58 1.73 134 34.65 32.68 1.93 
COV 155 2.31 0.17 8.77 159 2.34 0.72 8.37 134 3.7 0.59 22.85 
R 155 0.3 -0.28 0.64 159 0.31 0.27 0.24 134 0.31 0.32 0.16 
SZ 155 3.2 2.7 0.99 159 3.25 3.25 0.59 134 3.17 3.3 0.8 
SUBS 155 0.02 -0.55 0.46 159 0.01 0 0.06 134 0.01 0 0.02 
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 (0.29%) in 2006 and 0.35% (0.27%) in 2007 clearly indicating a drop in diversification level in 
property types or in geographic locations or both. The mean (median) for the amount of interest 
rate hedge for the overall sample is $93.5 million ($15.24 million), indicating a highly skewed 
distribution. This variable has a mean (median) of $105.3 million ($25.8 million) in 2006 and 
$79.5 million (0) in 2007, indicating a drop in dollar amount of interest rate hedge from 2006. 
Also, there is an increase in the CASH variable from the mean (median) of 45.36 (9.34) in 2006 
to 68.39 (17.28) in 2007 which also indicates that during this period, the REITs on an average 
retrained more cash in hand.  
 
Table 3 reports correlation among all the independent variables. The table indicates that 
firm size (SZ) and DEBT are highly correlated to some of the other independent variables. As a 
robustness check, all the regression models employ two regression analyses: one including size 
and debt and other excluding the two variables. 
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TABLE 3: Correlation among independent variables 
The sample includes total 293 REIT’s, 159 in 2006 and 134 in 2007.  
  
Hedge 
($) SELF M/B SZ DEBT COV CASH SUBS RATING 
CEO 
AGE CEO  INST R^2 DIV IV 
 
                      TENURE           
  
                              
SELF -0.02 
              
  
M/B -0.01 0.05 
             
  
SZ 0.09 -0.02 0.00 
            
  
DEBT 0.11* -0.02 -0.27* 0.18*** 
           
  
COV -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.20*** -0.32*** 
          
  
CASH 0.03 -0.10* 0.00 0.35*** 0.07 -0.02 
         
  
SUBS -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 
        
  
RATING 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.15*** -0.06 0.01 -0.05 
       
  
CEO AGE 0.01 0.12** 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.12** 
      
  
CEO TENURE -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.12** 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 
     
  
INST -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
    
  
R^2 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 
   
  
DIV -0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.14* 0.16*** -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.13** -0.02 -0.07 
  
  
IV 
   
0.26*** 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.11* 0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.11* 
 
  
COMP 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.20*** -0.07 -0.06 0.14** -0.03 -0.02 0.10* -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 
  
Note.—See appendix A for definition of variables. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** represents 5% level and * represents 10% level of significance 
 
 
20 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 In Table 4, I employ several specifications of regressions of our measures of PPS on our 
measure of diversification, hedging, interaction variable between diversification and hedging and 
control variables. I employ OLS regression with control variables, median regression to account 
for outliers and OLS robust regression to control for heteroskedasticity. Since panel data is used 
in this analysis, I conduct Hausman test (Housman, 1978) and fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the unique ( iu ) errors are not correlated with the regressors. Hence the preferred model is 
random effect. I also conduct Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, where I reject the 
null hypothesis that variances across entities is zero. There are significant differences across 
units (i.e. panel effect). Finally to control for heteroskedasticity in panel data, I run robust 
random effect regression.  
 
 Consistent with my hypothesis, Table 4 shows a positive and significant coefficient (at 
5%) for the interaction variable that measures the effect of both the risk management tools 
namely hedging and diversification for all regression specifications. When firm size and debt are 
included, the magnitude of the interaction variable indicates that if CEO uses both hedging and 
diversification as a tool to control risk, it increases the sensitivity of pay-for-performance by 
0.575, which is 2.59% of the sample median value of total pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(22.19) for the robust random effects model. This magnitude is 0.576, 0.565 and 0.576 
representing 2.60%, 2.55% and 2.60% of sample median for OLS with control variables, median 
OLS and robust OLS regressions. This lends some support to the notion that the CEOs 
compensation (here, pay-for-performance sensitivity) is positively and significantly related to the  
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TABLE 4: Regression Results of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, 
hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt 
 
tttt
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The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging, 
interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. Four regressions are reported: 
ordinary least squares (OLS), median, robust, and random effect. p values are reported in 
parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the OLS and random 
effects regression. The goodness-of-fit measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared 
(OLS, robust, and instrumental variable regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median 
regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
Variable                                                   Regression Method   
PPS 
 
OLS Median Robust Random Effect 
  
        
INTERCEPT 
 
     -0.432***     -0.465***     -0.432***    -0.464*** 
  
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Hedge) 
 
 1.696*  1.135*  1.696*  1.736* 
  
(0.089) (0.094) (0.085) (0.083) 
DIV 
 
0.478 0.585 0.478 0.536 
  
(0.179) (0.182) (0.345) (0.764) 
IV 
 
   0.576**    0.565**    0.576**    0.453** 
  
(0.045) (0.012) (0.045) (0.040) 
SELF 
 
    -0.038** -0.124   -0.038**   -0.132** 
  
(0.035) (0.361) (0.016) (0.021) 
M/B 
 
   -0.002**  -0.001*   -0.002*  -0.032* 
  
(0.062) (0.056) (0.082) (0.100) 
Ln(Size) 
 
   -0.025** -0.034 -0.025 -0.152 
  
(0.011) (0.145) (0.209) (0.253) 
DEBT 
 
0.011 1.457 0.011 0.521 
  
(0.221) (0.457) (0.567) (0.733) 
COV 
 
0.022 -0.032 -0.022 -0.053 
  
(0.963) (0.400) (0.732) (0.782) 
CASH 
 
 1.547* 2.764 1.547 1.632 
  
(0.085) (0.145) (0.373) (0.367) 
SUBS 
 
-0.206 -0.083   -0.206** -0.367* 
  
(0.132) (0.426) (0.031) (0.060) 
RATING 
 
-0.016 -0.030 -0.016 -0.162 
  
(0.373) (0.189) (0.484) (0.428) 
CEO Age 
 
0.243 0.346 0.243 -0.117 
  
(0.490) (0.205) (0.546) (0.645) 
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TABLE 4: CONTINUED 
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general risk level of the firm, which is better reflected by both diversification and hedging among 
REIT firms. 
 
 Consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Schrand and Unal (1998), 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Core and Guay (2002), I find a positive and significant (at 
10%) relationship between hedging and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. When firm size 
and debt are included, an increase in the dollar amount of interest rate hedge increases the pay-
for-performance sensitivity by an average of 0.01736 for the robust random effects model. This 
PPS is 0.01696, 0.01135 and 0.01696 for OLS with controls, median OLS and robust OLS 
regressions. Also consistent with the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom 
(1979), Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf (1984), Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987), Stulz (1990) and others, there is a positive relationship between CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity and diversification. But this coefficient is insignificant for all the 
regressions indicating that CEO compensation is more short term oriented, as hedging is more 
significantly related to CEO compensation because hedging is a relatively short term risk 
reduction strategy.  
 
 Table 5 excludes two variables size (SZ) and debt (DEBT). The results indicate a positive 
significant relationship (at 10%) between the interaction variable and CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. I also find a positive and significant (at 10%) relationship between hedging and CEO 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Consistent with Table 4, the coefficient of diversification is 
positive but insignificant for all the regressions indicating that CEO compensation is more short 
term oriented.  
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TABLE 5: Regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging, 
interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and DEBT 
 
The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging, 
interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and DEBT. Four regressions are 
reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median, robust, and random effect. p values are reported 
in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the OLS and random 
effects regression. The goodness-of-fit measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared 
(OLS, robust, and instrumental variable regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median 
regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
Variable                     Regression Method     
PPS 
 
OLS Median OLS Robust OLS Random Effect 
INTERCEPT 
 
   -0.478***     -0.708***     -0.478***    -0.477*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Hedge) 
 
 1.776*  0.197*  1.776*  2.136* 
  
(0.099) (0.070) (0.065) (0.063) 
DIV 
 
0.131 0.172 0.131 0.130 
  
(0.304) (0.382) (0.362) (0.420) 
IV 
 
  0.276*   0.249*    0.276*    0.277* 
  
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) 
SELF 
 
  -0.038**   -0.017**   -0.038**   -0.038** 
  
(0.019) (0.239) (0.015) (0.020) 
M/B 
 
-0.022 0.001 -0.022 -0.035 
  
(0.796) (0.055) (0.590) (0.811) 
COV 
 
-0.155 -0.142 -0.155 -0.153 
  
(0.754) (0.347) (0.699) (0.756) 
CASH 
 
1.745 0.764 1.745 1.762 
  
 
(0.785) (0.733) (0.414) (0.450) 
SUBS 
 
 -0.198*  -0.111*   -0.198**   -0.194** 
  
(0.082) (0.057) (0.040) (0.042) 
RATING 
 
0.015 -0.032 -0.015 -0.016 
  
(0.461) (0.085) (0.080) (0.079) 
CEO Age 
 
1.333 0.874 1.333 -0.117 
  
(0.816) (0.376) (0.346) (0.645) 
CEO Tenure 
 
-0.938 -0.515 -0.938 -0.522 
  
(0.502) (0.680) (0.515) (0.521) 
Institutional Holdings 
 
    1.810***     1.321***    1.810**   1.728** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.015) 
Ln(Returns^2) 
 
    0.209***      0.248***      0.209***      0.232*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Sample Size 
 
448 448 448 448 
Adjusted R
2
/pseudo R
2
 
 
0.559 0.453 0.579 0.598 
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To check if current values of the control variables may suffer from simulataneity, I re-
estimate the random effects model using lagged values. The results are similar to before.   
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In the random effects reported in Table 6 for both the regression models, the lag of hedge 
and lag of interaction variable are both positively and significantly related to both the PPS values 
of 2007 and 2006 at 5% level of significance.   
 
To summarize, I find a positive significant relationship between the interaction variable 
and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and conclude that the CEO compensation is more short 
term oriented. 
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TABLE 6: Regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on lags of diversification, 
hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt 
The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on lag values of 
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and 
DEBT. Random effect regressions are reported and p values are reported in parentheses. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the random effects regression. The 
goodness-of-fit measure reported is the adjusted R-squared. Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. The dependent variable in model [1] is PPS values for 2007 
and the dependent variable on model [2] is PPS values for 2006. Following is the regression 
equation: 
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Variable                                                     Regression Method   
  
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
PPS 2007   PPS 2006   
    Random Effect (Robust) p value Random Effect (Robust) p value 
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.635*** (0.000)  -0.736*** (0.000) 
ln(Hedge) 1t  
 
2.733* (0.099) 1.736* (0.076) 
DIV 1t  
 
1.725 (0.524) -0.478 (0.345) 
IV 1t  
 
1.456* (0.065) 2.832* (0.083) 
SELF 1t  
 
2.497 (0.652) -0.038 (0.726) 
M/B 1t  
 
-1.234 (0.721) -0.002 (0.826) 
Ln(Size) 1t  
 
0.424* (0.074) -0.025 (0.209) 
DEBT 1t  
 
2.257 (0.221) 0.011 (0.567) 
COV t  
 
0.002 (0.963) -0.022 (0.732) 
CASH 1t  
 
1.224 (0.875) 1.547 (0.373) 
SUBS 1t  
 
-3.862 (0.487) -0.206** (0.031) 
RATING 1t  
 
1.398 (0.373) -0.016 (0.484) 
CEO Age 1t  
 
0.497 (0.490) 0.243 (0.546) 
CEO Tenure 1t  
 
-0.611 (0.306) -0.638 (0.528) 
Institutional Holdings 1t  
 
2.833* (0.061) 1.458** (0.025) 
Ln(Returns^2) 1t  
 
3.725*** (0.000) 0.209*** (0.000) 
  
        
Sample Size 
 
134   155   
Adjusted R - squared    0.301   0.356   
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
In the above analysis, I used a dummy variable as a proxy for the interaction between 
hedging and diversification. Hence I calculate an alternative variable, hedge proposition, which 
is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to the dollar value of total assets. The interaction 
variable is now calculated as hedge proportion time‟s diversification.  
 
 In the above tables, table 7 presents results of regressions including the size and debt 
variables and table 8 excludes size and debt variables. I employ OLS with control variables, 
median OLS, robust OLS and robust random effects model. Consistent with the results obtained 
from the regression equations using dummy variables for the interaction variables, I find positive 
significant  (at 10%)  relationship  between  CEO  pay-for-performance  sensitivity  and  the                         
interaction variable giving precedence to the conclusion that the CEO compensation depends on 
how well he manages firm risk by using both hedging and diversification as tools in the REIT 
industry. Also consistent with the previous conclusion, I find that there exists a positive 
significant relationship (at 1%) between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and hedge 
proportion and a positive but not significant relationship between CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and diversification. This indicates that CEOs compensation is more short term 
oriented because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy. When analyzing the 
relationship between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and the interaction variable, care 
must be taken about interpreting the coefficients of hedge proportion and diversification since 
marginal effect of one, depends on the value of the other. To better understand the coefficient, 
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one can evaluate then at their means; evaluate derivative of CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity 
with respect to hedge proportion, at the mean of firm diversification. 
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TABLE 7: Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on 
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. 
 
The table represents robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on 
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. I 
define a new variable hedge proposition which is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to 
the dollar value of total assets. The interaction variable now is calculated as hedge proportion 
times diversification. Four regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median, 
robust, and random effect. p values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported for the OLS and random effects regression. The goodness-of-fit 
measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared (OLS, robust, and instrumental variable 
regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
 
Variable                 Regression Method     
PPS 
 
OLS Median Robust Random Effect 
  
 
        
Intercept 
 
    -0.432***     -0.382***     -0.432***     -0.536*** 
  
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hedge Proportion  
 
     2.510***      3.942***      2.510***      1.105*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
DIV 
 
0.037     0.065** 0.037 0.173 
  
(0.227) (0.014) (0.305) (0.454) 
IV 
 
 0.332*   0.345*  0.332*   0.931* 
  
(0.081) (0.072) (0.075) (0.089) 
SELF 
 
   -0.037** -0.018    -0.037**   0.163** 
  
(0.022) (0.188) (0.017) (0.035) 
M/B 
 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.034 
  
(0.763) (0.967) (0.495) (0.647) 
Ln(Size) 
 
-0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.023 
  
(0.505) (0.786) (0.463) (0.743) 
DEBT 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.017 
  
(0.950) (0.914) (0.951) (0.846) 
COV 
 
-0.132 -0.182 -0.132 -0.234 
  
(0.705) (0.344) (0.674) (0.746) 
CASH 
 
0.547 0.746 0.547 0.847 
  
(0.413) (0.287) (0.378) (0.413) 
SUBS 
 
-0.174 -0.038  -0.174* -0.145 
  
(0.322) (0.656) (0.070) (0.322) 
RATING 
 
-0.011    -0.040** -0.011 0.174 
  
(0.598) (0.025) (0.625) (0.598) 
CEO Age 
 
-0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.024 
  
(0.860) (0.641) (0.864) (0.742) 
CEO Tenure 
 
-0.002 0.007 0.002 0.243 
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TABLE 7: CONTINUED 
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TABLE 8: Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on 
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables excluding size and debt 
 
The table represents robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on 
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. I 
define a new variable hedge proposition which is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to 
the dollar value of total assets. The interaction variable now is calculated as hedge proportion 
times diversification. Four regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median, 
robust, and random effect. p values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported for the OLS and random effects regression. The goodness-of-fit 
measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared (OLS, robust, and instrumental variable 
regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
 
Variable                 Regression Method   
PPS 
 
OLS Median Robust Random Effect 
  
 
        
Intercept 
 
    -0.517***     -0.839***     -0.517***     -0.487*** 
  
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hedge Proportion  
 
     2.464***       3.954***      2.464***     2.510*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DIV 
 
0.039   0.069* 0.039 0.064 
  
(0.189) (0.002) (0.264) (0.543) 
IV 
 
  0.321*   0.364*   0.321*   0.631* 
  
(0.100) (0.092) (0.094) (0.083) 
SELF 
 
   -0.037** -0.016   -0.037**   -0.163** 
  
(0.021) (0.161) (0.016) (0.021) 
M/B 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.098 
  
(0.779) (0.747) (0.555) (0.763) 
COV 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.053 
  
(0.809) (0.702) (0.781) (0.983) 
CASH 
 
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.009 
  
(0.539) (0.201) (0.488) (0.874) 
SUBS 
 
-0.168 -0.035   -0.168* -0.174 
  
(0.335) (0.626) (0.079) (0.322) 
RATING 
 
-0.011    -0.035** -0.011 -0.111 
  
(0.583) (0.023) (0.620) (0.698) 
CEO Age 
 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.104 
  
(0.940) (0.530) (0.643) (0.860) 
CEO Tenure 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.735 
  
(0.845) (0.965) (0.847) (0.731) 
Institutional Holdings 
 
  0.002*       0.001***      0.002*** 0.008 
  
(0.091) (0.000) (0.006) (0.697) 
Ln(Returns^2) 
 
    0.221***      0.281***      0.221***      0.222*** 
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TABLE 8: CONTINUED 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper generates two important insights regarding the connection between hedging 
and diversification on CEO compensation, measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity. First, I 
find that there exists a positive and significant relationship between the interaction variable that 
measures the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. Second, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is positive and significantly related to 
hedging. Relationship between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and diversification is not 
consistent and insignificant.  
 
 Using a variety of regression measures, I demonstrate that a robust relationship exists 
between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and the interaction variable between firm hedging 
and diversification, indicating that CEO compensation should be based on how well he/she 
manages the general risk level of the firm which is better reflected by firm hedging and 
diversification. I also demonstrate that there exist a robust relationship between CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity and firm hedging indicating that compensation is more short term 
oriented because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy. 
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Chapter 2: The Relative Informativeness of Regular and E-mini EURO/DOLLAR Futures 
Contracts and the Role of Trader Types 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Price discovery is a process by which related markets attempt to incorporate new 
information to reach an equilibrium price. It is particularly important to analyze the issue of price 
discovery for currency futures because of its relatively large market size in terms of volume. 
Currency market is one of the largest, one of the fastest growing and one of the most liquid 
financial markets in the world with an average daily turnover of $ 4 trillion in 2010 which is 20% 
higher than 2009 numbers. Out of this, 37% represents an increase in the currency futures 
market. 1  Within this market, EUR/USD is by far the dominant pair, with a 28% share in the 
global currency futures market turnover by currency pair. 2  This absolute dominance over other 
currency pairs begs for a more detailed analysis. The Euro currency futures traded on Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) is ranked first out of top twenty foreign exchange futures traded 
ranked by the number of contracts. 3  In 2010, 85,370,148 contracts were traded as compared to 
53,873,989 contracts in 2009, which makes for a 58.46% increase. Similarly the number of 
contracts traded in e-mini EUR/USD futures market increased from 657,689 contracts to 
1,237,773 contracts which is an 88.20% jump. 4  This is by far the highest percent volume 
increase on CME and makes it one of the most tradable markets in recent years. 
 
,1 2
The data source is “Triennial Central Bank Survey – Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2010” for December 2010 from 
www.bis.org. 
3
Data source is “Annual volume survey – 2010” from Futures Industries Association (FIA) web site 
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Volume-Mar_FI%28R%29.pdf 
4
Data source is from “Semi-Annual Foreign Exchange Volume Survey” from the Foreign Exchange Committee (FXC) website 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/news/ and CME monthly volume reports. 
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In this paper, I examine the relative contribution of regular and e-mini futures market to 
price discovery  of EUR/USD  futures  contracts  on  the  CME.  Stated differently, since e-mini 
contracts are more likely to be traded by small traders, I attempt to find out the relative 
contributions of large and small traders to price discovery and how they react to new information 
using the information share (IS) approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995). 5  
 
 Moreover, I also examine if the regular future‟s information share (IS) can be 
explained by the positioning of commercial traders (hedgers) and non-commercial traders 
(speculators). To put it differently, I will examine if trader type in the CME regular futures 
market can explain information share. This will provide an insight into the relative importance of 
different types of traders visa vie IS and their leadership in generating information. The trader 
type classification (commercial vs. non-commercial trader) available with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) trade data allows the study of the effects of proprietary 
trading by various types of traders. 6  Categorizing theses traders is important to understand the 
role they play in financial markets. 
 
The interpretation of this relationship between the IS and trader type classification can be 
used to determine which of the trader type (commercial and non-commercial) reflects higher 
degree of private information. Representative studies by Scholes (1972) and Evans and Lyons  
5
E-mini trading is associated with higher transaction costs for larger trades. Brokerage commissions are charged on a per contract basis. Hence 
even if the bid-ask spread is smaller; the total transaction costs per dollar of trading volume will be higher in the E-mini market. Therefore, the 
logical conclusion is that E-mini market will be dominated by small investors and the institutional traders will trade in the lower cost regular 
futures markets. (Kurov and Lasser 2004). 
6
 When an individual reportable trader is identified to the Commission, the trader is classified either as "commercial" or "non-commercial." All 
of a trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular 
commodity for hedging as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 CFR 1.3(z). 
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(2002)  conclude  that  there is  a  positive  correlation  between  order  flow  and  exchange  rate 
movements. They interpret this as the traders placing the orders have private information. 7  
 
I expect to find large traders in the regular futures market to be better informed than the 
small traders in the e-mini futures market. The rational here is, a large body of literature indicates 
that the regular futures markets have fewer constraints, higher leverage, lower transaction costs, 
and instruments that make it easy to speculate and hedge which makes it an ideal market for 
informed investors. These large investors are more likely to be institutional investors with greater 
financial, technical and analytical skills. Earlier and recent studies by Ates and Wang (2005), Tse 
and Xiang (2005) and Tao and Song (2010) find that index futures market dominate e-mini 
market in price discovery. Existing studies by Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Nofsinger and 
Sias (1999), Barber and Odean (2000), Chakravarty (2001), and Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2007) all analyze trader types and suggest that small traders are mostly individual traders in the 
e-mini futures markets that usually have limited capital and are relatively less informed than the 
large traders as they lack the technical and analytical skills to make sound financial decisions. 
 
My contributions to the existing literature are twofold. Firstly, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first attempt that examines the relative contribution of regular and e-mini 
futures market to price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts. This is also the first paper that 
compares regular and e-mini contracts in the currency futures market. Studies by Kurov  and  
Lasser  (2004),  Ates  and  Wang  (2005),  Tse  and  Xiang  (2005)  and  Tao  and  Song  (2010)  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
7
 Noise traders enhance the market liquidity, but make the information discovery process longer. Kyle (1985), French and Roll (1986) present 
evidence that suggests the influence of noise trading is non-trivial. 
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 analyze price discovery between regular and e-mini index futures market, but no study has 
compared regular and e-mini contracts in currency futures market. 
 
Secondly, this is the first paper that analyzes the contribution of trader type to 
information share (IS) in the currency markets. This allows for a deeper understanding as to 
whether commercial (hedger) or non-commercial (speculator) traders account for a large share of 
price discovery in the futures market. Related studies by Klitgaard and Weir (2004) and Gorton, 
Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) ran regression of returns on contemporaneous changes in 
speculative trader positions and found evidence of either private information or trend chasing 
behavior among speculators, but they do not analyze the information share. Another related 
study by Schwarz (2011) concerning the relationship between positioning of hedgers and 
speculators and returns in equity future markets find that the revelation of speculative positions 
are informative to investors, which supports private information hypothesis. By analyzing the 
relationship between hedgers, speculators and information share, I attempt to determine the 
relative contributions of different traders to price discovery in financial markets.  
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature 
followed by section 3 that describes data and section 4 provides the methodologies and results. 
Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
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2.     LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1   Price Discovery 
 
 Previous studies on commodity derivative markets by Garbade and Silber (1982) Khoury 
and Yourougou (1991), Schroeder and Goodwin (1991), Schwary and Szakmary (1994), 
Brockman and Tse (1995) and Ivanov and Cho (2010) all conclude that there is price leadership 
in the regular futures market. 
 
 Studies on equity index derivative markets are to the best of the term, inconclusive. 
Among studies on non-U.S index markets, Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994), Iihara, 
Kato, & Tokunaga (1996), Shyy, Vijayraghavan, and Scott-Quinn (1996), Kofman and Moser 
(1997), Breedon and Holland (1998), Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz (1999), Roope and 
Zurbruegg (2002), So and Tse (2004), Tse and Xiang, and Fung (2006) all report that equity 
index futures prices lead price discovery more when futures are traded electronically. On the 
other hand Massimb and Phelps (1994), Chow, Lee and Shyy (1996), Martens (1998) and Franke 
and Hess (2000) find that price discovery is in the open outcry markets. This is because 
compared to open outcry markets, electronic systems impose additional costs and risks. It is also 
because floor traders can observe the actions of other traders which help them to react. Studies 
on price discovery process in the equity index futures in certain U.S. exchanges include  
Hasbrouck (2003), Joel (2003), Kurov and Lasser (2004), Ates and Wang (2005), Yiuman et al 
(2006), Wang, Chung and Yang (2007). They examine the price discovery process in S & P 500 
and Nasdaq 100 index and concluded that e-mini index futures played a dominant role in the 
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price discovery process. 8  Information share measuring technique proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) 
is used to analyze IS for the equity index futures markets. 
 
 Similarly, studies on currency futures markets are not clear. The studies include Crain 
and Lee (1995) Martens and Kofman (1998), Chatrath and Song (1998) and Rosenberg and 
Traub (2009) all examine the price leadership between regular futures and foreign exchange 
(FX) spot market, use Granger causality and conclude that in spite the dominance of spot market 
in terms of volume, the foreign exchange futures market play a leading role in price discovery. 9  
This may be due to high level of transparency in the futures markets in comparison to the spot 
market as suggested by Hasbrouck (2004). On the other hand, Poskitt (2009) and Chen and Gau 
(2010) find that regular futures have lower information share than spot. 10  Among studies that 
compare three markets simultaneously in currency  futures market, Tse, Xiang and  Fung (2006) 
concluded that  relative contribution to price discovery in GLOBEX electronic futures dominates 
floor futures and spot trading in the EUR/USD FX market and spot trading dominates futures 
trading in the YEN/USD market. Floor trading futures markets contribute the least to the price 
discovery for both the currencies, consistent with Theissen (2002) and Hasbrouck (2003) study 
on stock markets. But Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009) conclude that EBS electronic interdealer 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8  Some cited papers analyze the relationship between regular futures, E-mini futures and Exchange traded funds (ETF‟s), while others analyze 
the relationship between regular and E-mini futures market. 
9  Crain and Lee (1995) Martens and Kofman (1998) examine the price leadership between Regular futures and FX spot market for 
Deutschemark (DM)/USD exchange rate.  Crain and Lee (1995) examines the impact of 19 monthly announcements using hourly price data from 
CME and Martens and Kofman (1998) use the Reuters spot exchange data (all trades FXFX) and futures data from CME for three months from 
June to August 1993.Rosenberg and Traub (2009).  Rosenberg and Traub (2009) find that, for 3 months in 1996, currency futures markets from 
CME for Deutsche Mark, British Pound, Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc have 80% - 90% price discovery when comparing with spot transactions 
data from Reuters dealing 2000-1 system. They also report that the spot market leads futures market using spot market quotes from Bloomberg 
over the period from March to May 2006. A possible explanation for their result is that “greater transparency is generally associated with more 
informative prices” (Madhavan, 2000). A market with low transparency is typically associated with lower degree of price discovery. As pointed 
out by Rime (2003), the interdealer direct trading platform by Reuters Dealing 2000-1 has a relatively low level of price transparency. However, 
the spot market might have become more transparent over time. Chatrath and Song (1998) investigate the intraday reactions in the yen futures 
market and spot market and conclude that volatility spillover is from the futures to spot market for the period January 1992 to December 1995. 
10
 Poskitt (2009) compared GLOBEX and Reuters D3000 in the electronic sterling/dollar exchange while Chen and Gau (2010) compared CME 
and EBS for the EUR/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates.  
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spot dominates GLOBEX futures and e-mini futures in price discovery for both EUR/USD and 
YEN/USD exchange  markets. They conclude that the leadership in spot market is due to the 
large size of the interdealer spot market (EBS). Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009) also suggest 
that Tse, Xiang and Fung (2006) find different results for the EUR/USD exchange rate because 
the spot platform that they use (CMC) is likely to have uninformed traders. 
 
 Studies related to the present paper suggest that regular futures market might play a big 
role in price discovery when compared to e-mini futures market. But Kurov and Lasser (2004) 
examine price dynamics in the S & P 500 and Nasdaq 100 index futures markets for the period 
May to September 2001 find that price discovery takes place in the e-mini futures market visa 
vie floor traded regular futures market. They interpret this result to conclude that e-mini markets 
still are important “satellite” markets, despite an exemplary growth in this market.  On the other 
hand, Tse and Xiang (2005), Tse and Xiang (2005) and Tao and Song (2010) both conclude that 
the contribution by e-mini market is relatively higher compared to their share of trading volume. 
Tao and Song (2010) compared e-mini index futures in Hang Seng Index Futures market 
(MHSIF) to standard Hang Seng Index Futures (HSIF) for the year 2005 and concluded that 
MHSIF contribute 16.8% to price discovery which is disproportionately high considering the low 
volume in MHSIF compared to HSIF. They interpret this result to conclude that MHSIF market 
attracts small traders and small informed traders that improve informational efficiency. 
 
 In contrast, Ates and Wang (2005) find inconclusive results when they examined price 
discovery between floor traded index futures and electronic e-mini index futures in the S & P 
500 and Nasdaq 100 markets and find that from September 1997 to August 1998 index futures 
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contributed to price discovery. From August 1998 to February 2000 and from February 2000 to 
December 2001, they find that e-mini and index futures markets were respectively responsible 
for price discovery. But for Nasdaq 100 market, they conclude that e-mini contributed more to 
price discovery during the entire period. These results can be used to conclude that e-mini futures 
market made larger contributions to price discovery during the period of high volatility.  
 
2.2   Market Microstructure 
 
 Microstructure theories usually assume that informed traders are usually insiders who 
have private information about the firms. But knowledge of specific security may not be an 
important source of information in the futures markets because according to Subrahmanyam 
(1991) such information is diversified. But this does not lead to efficient market as some traders 
are more efficient in interpreting publically available information or can react faster to the new 
information than other traders. Lyons (1995), Yao (1998) and Payne (2003) all use data from 
foreign exchange dealers and conclude that spreads contain information component. Hence price 
discovery takes place either because some traders are more efficient in interpreting publically 
available information or because they react faster to the new information than other traders.  
Lately, empirical research by Kurov and Lasser (2004) and Erenburg, Kurov and Lasser (2006) 
suggest that exchange locals are more informed than off exchange locals in the e-mini S & P 500 
and Nasdaq 100 markets. Using Hasbrouck (1995) methodology, they support the notion that 
locals are market makers and are privy to private information. 
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 Webb and Smith (1994), Wang, Michalski, Jordan and Moriarty (1994) and Ates and 
Wang (2005) all conclude that liquidity is one of the components that determine the rate of price 
discovery in the foreign exchange futures markets. This implies that traders generating liquidity 
in the futures markets lead to price discovery. Cohen and Shin (2003), Danielsson and Love 
(2006), using U.S. treasury and spot foreign exchange market data, find evidence of positive 
feedback trading (trend chasing). His is because the market is dominated by large traders who 
hold considerable inventory. On the other hand Antoniou, Kutmos and Pericli (2005) find no 
evidence of positive feedback trading in the index futures markets of six developed nations. They 
conclude that this is because rational speculators trading index futures may help stabilize 
underlying stock price. Lately, Kurov (2008) examined how the order flow of trades in the index 
futures markets is affected by recent price changes and conclude that index futures traders use 
positive feedback trading strategies i.e. buy after price increase and sell after price declines.  
 
 Literature related to present paper on microstructure includes Klitgaard and Weir (2004) 
and Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) who ran a simple OLS regression of returns on 
change in speculative position for currency futures and nonfinancial futures market. They 
examine publically available data on the weekly commitments of trader‟s reports published by 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and find a strong relationship between 
changes in speculators net positions and changes in exchange rates. They also find that when the 
information about speculators commitments of traders is generated in a particular week, an 
observer could have a 75% chance of guessing the direction of the exchange rates in that week 
correctly. They interpret this as an evidence of either private information or trend chasing 
behavior of speculators. Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) also ran regression of returns 
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on speculative levels for nonfinancial firms and interpreted the results as evidence of trend 
chasing behavior. Schwarz (2011) study the relationship between positioning of hedgers and 
speculators and returns in equity index futures markets and find significant relationship between 
position changes and returns. They conclude that when speculators hold long positions in the 
futures market, the returns are high. This can be due to private information, liquidity or positive 
feedback. By proposing new test for private information hypothesis, Schwarz (2011) concluded 
that investors react to announcements of speculator positioning which support private 
information hypothesis. 
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3.    DATA 
 
 Three categories of data is used in this paper i.e. intraday tic GLOBEX EUR/USD futures 
data, e-mini futures data from CME and net positions of different types of traders from CFTC 
which are reported weekly. The sample period is from January 2010 to December 2010, with a 
total of 252 trading days. 
 
3.1    Futures Market Data 
 
 The regular futures market data set used in this study is from the best bid or offer (BBO) 
one second intraday data of the EURO/USD futures traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). The EURO/USD futures contract traded on CME has a contract size of €125,000 with a 
minimum price fluctuation of $0.00005 per euro increments ($6.25/contract). The electronic 
trading is conducted on the CME GLOBEX trading platform and runs from 1700 CST to 1600 
CST (Central Standard Time) the next day, Sunday through Friday. The trading is closed at 1600 
CST on Fridays and reopened on Sundays at 1700 CST.  
 
 CME e-mini euro futures began trading in 1999 on CME GLOBEX. E-mini futures 
contracts are half the size of the regular futures contracts to make it affordable to traders with 
small margin accounts. The e-mini futures market data set used in this study is from the best bid 
or offer (BBO) intraday data of the EURO/USD futures traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). The EURO/USD futures contract traded on CME has a contract size of €62,500 with a 
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minimum price fluctuation of $0.0001 per euro increments ($6.25/contract). The trading time is 
the same as that of regular EUR/USD futures. 
 
 The filtered data for CME regular futures include 17,123,819 quote observations, while 
that for e-mini include 11,854,327 quote observations. The BBO intraday data of CME reports 
quoted bid and ask price. I follow Hasbrouck (1995) approach to calculate the trading price, 
defined as the average of bid-ask quoted prices. Table 1 reports summary statistics of log of 
average bid-ask price quotes of EUR/USD traded on CME for the regular and e-mini futures 
markets. 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of log of average bid-ask price quotes of EUR/USD traded on 
CME for the regular and emini futures markets. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics of 
one second futures midquotes of EUR/USD traded on CME for Regular and e-mini futures 
markets. Panel B reports correlation coefficient between regular and emini futures data 
 
 
EUR/USD Regular Futures Emini Futures 
      
Number of Transactions 17,123,819 11,854,327 
Mean 0.282 0.253 
Standard Deviation 0.045 0.045 
Skewness -0.285 -0.065 
Kurtosis -0.362 0.423 
Jarque-Bera  6843.912*** 7988.588*** 
Average number of quotes per 
hour  2054.42 2945.26 
      
Correlation Coefficient between      
regular futures and e-mini 
futures     
      
Regular Futures   0.919*** 
 
        Note: *** denotes statistically significant at 1% 
 
The price series in both markets show negative kurtosis, indicating a flat tail. The Jarque-Bera (J-
B) test indicates that the midquote series in two markets are not normally distributed. During the 
one year period covered in the sample, trading activity was significantly higher for regular 
futures as compared to e-mini futures. The total number of transactions is higher in regular 
futures than e-mini futures. The correlation coefficient indicates that the series are highly 
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correlated. Also on average, regular futures have a substantially large number of quotes as 
compared to e-mini futures.  
 
3.2   Futures Positioning Data 
 
 CFTC was created in 1974 and requires the futures market participants with positions 
above a certain level to report open interest on a weekly bases. This prevents collusion and 
manipulation in the futures markets. Since 1992, on Friday each week, the positions data 
collected on Tuesday of the same week is released. 11  The data includes open interest, reportable   
positions, commercial and non-commercial traders, non reportable positions, spreading, changes 
in commitments from previous reports, percent of open interest and number of traders. A detailed 
explanation of the position data is given in the Appendix. 
 
 According to the CFTC, when an individual “Reportable Position” is identified to the 
commission, the position is classified as either "commercial" (hedger) or "non-commercial" 
(speculator). All of the trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as  
commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging.  Mutual 
funds and corporate pension funds are examples of some of the types of companies that are 
classified as hedgers. Hedgers trade in futures markets to offset their risks form the underlying 
instrument. In other words, hedgers buy insurance when they deal in the futures markets. On the 
other hand, speculators aim is to profit from the fluctuations in the futures prices by betting on 
the exchange rate movements. Commodity trading advisors (CTA), as a group is an example of a 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
11
The positions data was collected semi-monthly and monthly before the year 1992. 
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 non-commercial or a speculative trader in the futures market. CFTC also reports third category 
of position called “Non-reportable Positions”. The long and short open interest shown as "Non-
reportable Positions" is derived by subtracting total long and short "Reportable Positions" from 
the total open interest. Accordingly, for "Non-reportable Positions," the number of traders 
involved and the commercial/non-commercial classification of each trader are unknown. This 
data involves firms who are too small to classify hence are ignored for all practical purposes in 
this paper. 
 
 The CFTC categorizes commercial traders into a diverse group that includes banks, 
hedge funds, mutual funds, corporate pension funds, currency dealers and nonfinancial 
corporations. 13  The non-commercial trader forms the more homogenous group which includes 
commodity trading advisors who are profit driven. Because speculators tend to destabilize the 
market, CFTC keeps a close watch on their activities. Hence even though some traders classified 
as hedgers can act as speculators, they have an incentive to be classified as commercial traders. 
To ensure that traders are classified with accuracy and consistency, CFTC staff may exercise 
judgment in re-classifying a trader if it has additional information about the trader‟s use of the 
markets.  
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the raw average number of long and short contracts for each 
trader type for the regular futures contracts. The CFTC does not report the breakdown of trader 
type positions for the e-mini futures contracts. The non-commercial traders (speculators) on an 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
13
 A trader may be classified as a commercial trader in some commodities and as a non-commercial trader in other commodities. A single 
trading entity cannot be classified as both a commercial and non-commercial trader in the same commodity. Nonetheless, a multi-functional 
organization that has more than one trading entity may have each trading entity classified separately in a commodity. For example, a financial 
organization trading in financial futures may have a banking entity whose positions are classified as commercial and have a separate money-
management entity whose positions are classified as non-commercial.
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TABLE 2: Summary statistics of Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) positioning data 
 
 
The table represents summary statistics of CFTC positioning data. Panel A of Table 2 shows the raw average number of long and short 
contracts for each trader type for the regular futures contracts. The three columns of Panel B describe the ratio of open interest for 
trader type i (commercial, noncommercial, non reporter) relative to total open interest of all contracts. 
 
 
                    Panel A 
Index              Noncommercial                              Commercial                 Nonreportable 
 
Long Short Long Short Long  Short 
EUR/USD  
      Regular Futures 47,226 81,826 117,357 80,561 46,228 48,425 
       
       Panel B 
      
      
Ratio of trader type 
relative        
      
to total open interest 
across types       
   
 
   
       
       
       
Index 
                  
Noncommercial                Commercial   
                 
Nonreportable   
       EUR/USD  
      Regular Futures -0.0052                            0.0036             -0.0004   
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average take a net short position. Similarly, the commercial traders (hedgers) on an average take 
a net long position. 14    
 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the breakdown of trader type relative to total outstanding 
positions. To calculate the net position, I use the normalization method proposed by Schwarz 
(2011). The formula to calculate net position is: 



jj
shortlong
shortlong
q
j
t
j
t
i
t
i
ti
t  
Where, long
i
t
 and short
i
t
 represents trader type i  with long and short positions at time t  , and j  
represents time stamp from week 1 to week 52. According to Schwarz (2011), this normalization 
will allow for the regression coefficients will have the same interpretation across all the different 
types of traders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
14
Hedgers are long 45 weeks out of 52 weeks in 2010, suggesting that they have a tendency to be buyers.   
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4.    METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
4.1  Information Share Approach 
  
The present study takes the approach of Hasbrouck (1995) to estimate the information share (IS). 
15  This measure is based on the vector error correction model (VECM) developed by Engle and 
Granger (1987).  I generate time series of midquotes for  EURO/USD futures and  e-mini  traded 
on CME over the sample period in 2010 by doing the following. In each month, the most 
actively traded nearest-to-maturity contract was extracted. Five days prior to its expiration the 
next-maturity contract was selected in the sample. The quotes must be two-sided, with a positive 
value of bid-ask spread. I form time series of the futures midquotes from 1700 CST to 1600 CST 
next day during the period of January 2010 to December 2010. Midquote returns are calculated  
from  the  time  series  of  the  prevailing  futures  mid-quote  sampled  at  one-second and 
weekly sampling interval. The unit root test for stationarity of midquote series is performed. 
Johansen‟s (1988) method is employed to check whether the regular and e-mini futures on CME 
are co-integrated.  
 
The vector error correction model (VECM) is defined as:  
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
15
Hasbrouck‟s approach (1995) has been widely used to access information share: Mizrach and Neely (2008), Forte and Peña (2009), Poskitt 
(2009), Cabrera, Wang, and Yang (2009), Chen and Gau (2010), and Frjins, Gilbert, and Tourani-Red (2010). 
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where 
tregP ,  and tieP ,min  are the first log difference of the futures midquotes for regular futures 
and e-mini futures on CME, respectively. ie min  is the co-integrated vector between the two 
markets such that 
1,minmin1,   tieietregreg PP   is co-integrated of order 1. Q  is the number of lags 
in the model based on multivariate Schwarz Bayesian criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The coefficients 
of the error correction term 
reg  and ie min (adjustment coefficients) indicate the responsiveness 
of the midquote series to any deviation from the equilibrium relationship. treg ,  and tie ,min  are 
the residuals that are not autocorrelated.  
 
 Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share of one market as the proportion of the 
variance of price innovation attributed to the variance of the innovation in the market of interest. 
The contribution of one market to the price discovery process (i.e., share in price discovery) is 
defined as: 
IS = 
2
min
2
min
22
22
ieieregreg
regreg



 
where the innovations are not correlated and reg  and mine  are estimated from the residual 
covariance matrix of the VECM and as: 
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where the innovations are correlated and the subscripts UB and LB denote upper and lower 
bounds, respectively. ie min and reg  
are defined as the common factor component of e-mini 
futures and regular futures respectively, reg is the standard deviation of regular futures, 
2
min ie  
is 
the variance of e-mini futures and CI is the Cholesky factorization value. According to Ballie et 
al. (2002), the mean of the upper and lower bounds is a reasonable estimate of a market‟s 
information share. A higher value of IS indicates a larger contribution from the regular contracts.  
 
            The standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test confirms that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root for the regular and e-mini futures price series. The Johansen (1991) 
cointegration tests show that the regular and e-mini futures prices are cointegrated and hence 
share a common stochastic trend.   
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TABLE 3: Information Shares (IS) 
 
The table represents information share for the sample period from January 2010 to December 
2010. Panel A describes one second sampling mean, median and standard deviation estimates 
relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and e-mini futures EUR/USD contract Panel 
B shows weekly sampling mean median and standard deviation estimates for 52 weeks. 
Information shares are computed from the vector error correction model (VECM) suggested by 
Hasbrouck (1995). 
 
Panel A 
                                   Regular contracts                        E-mini contracts 
         
    
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound   
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound 
                  
Mean 
 
0.394 0.665 0.935 
 
0.188 0.334 0.479 
Median 
 
0.463 0.728 0.993 
 
0.264 0.414 0.563 
SD   0.063 0.208 0.353   0.072 0.192 0.311 
 
 
Panel B 
                          Regular contracts                        E-mini contracts 
         
    
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound   
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound 
                  
Mean 
 
0.345 0.619 0.892 
 
0.172 0.328 0.484 
Median 
 
0.459 0.707 0.954 
 
0.248 0.376 0.504 
SD   0.052 0.201 0.349   0.065 0.185 0.304 
 
            Following the standard practice, Panel A of Table 3 describes one second sampling mean, 
median and standard deviation estimates relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and 
e-mini futures EUR/USD contracts. The lower and upper bounds do not provide a single measure 
of IS. However Ballie et al. (2002), Booth, Lin, Martikainen and Tse (2002) and many others 
propose that the mean of the upper and lower bounds is a reasonable estimate of a market‟s 
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information share. Panel A shows that regular futures account for 66.5% contribution to price 
discovery where as e-mini futures contribute 33.4% to price discovery. Panel B shows weekly 
sampling mean median and standard deviation estimates. The results show that regular futures 
account for 61.9% contribution to price discovery where as e-mini futures contribute 32.8% to 
price discovery.  The implication is that regular futures reflect information more efficiently 
compared to e-mini futures for both the one second sampling interval and the weekly sampling 
interval. The potential explanation is that a large body of literature indicates that the regular 
futures markets have fewer constraints, higher leverage, lower transaction costs, and instruments 
that make it easy to speculate and hedge which makes it an ideal market for informed investors. 
These large investors are more likely to be institutional investors with greater financial, technical 
and analytical skills. The finding may also not be surprising given the lower trading activity in 
the e-mini futures market (Table 1) which is consistent with the notion that a more liquid market 
is also more informative. Also according to Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009), the trading in the 
e-mini futures markets is concentrated among a few bankers and hence there might not be any 
informed traders in this market.      
         
             A regression model, similar to one used by Klitgaard and Weir (2004) and Schwarz 
(2011), is used to analyze how the positioning could affect contribution to price discovery. 
 
  
 
where, ISt denotes the information share of the regular futures market calculated using the 
weekly sampling interval on every Tuesday and c is a constant. NonComln( ) is the logarithm of 
  )Reln()ln()ln()]1/(ln[ 321 pNonComNonComcISIS kk
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the open positioning data for non-commercial traders, )ln(Com is the logarithm of the open 
position for commercial traders and )Reln( pNon is the logarithm of the open positioning data 
for non-reportable (small) traders. The IS is constrained to the interval [0, 1]. I use log 
transformation of IS =  )]1/(ln[ tt ISIS   
 
           TABLE 4: Effects of trader’s positions on information share using Hasbrouck (1995) 
 
The table show the effects of trader‟s positions on information share (IS) where information 
share of the regular futures is the dependent variable calculated using the weekly sampling 
interval on every Tuesday and is measured by the Hasbrouck (1995) approach. Independent 
variables are non-commercial, commercial trader and non-reportable type position. Ln denotes 
logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The standard errors of the estimates are 
computed based on the procedure of Newey-West (1987) to adjust for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression errors. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression model is specified as 
follows: 
 
            _____________ ________________________________________________________ 
                           Dependent variable: the relative contribution to price discovery 
          ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         
         
  
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
                  
Variable   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
         Constant 
 
  4.736*** 
 
  3.763*** 
 
  3.635*** 
 
  3.987*** 
  
 (0.000) 
 
  (0.000) 
 
  (0.000) 
 
  (0.000) 
Non-
com 
 
   3.874** 
 
     ---- 
 
  2.764** 
 
   2.976** 
  
  (0.010) 
   
  (0.014) 
 
  (0.020) 
Com 
 
    0.765* 
 
    1.763 
 
     ---- 
 
    0.635 
  
  (0.096) 
 
   (0.852) 
   
(0.071)* 
Non-rep 
 
    1.763 
 
    -2.763 
 
    1.736 
 
     ---- 
  
  (0.873) 
 
(0.765) 
 
  (0.693) 
  
  
 
       Adjusted R 2  0.386 
 
0.127 
 
0.189 
 
0.302 
Nos   52   52   52   52 
  )Reln()ln()ln()]1/(ln[ 321 pNonComNonComcISIS kk
)]1/(ln[ kk ISIS 
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            Table 4 reports the regression results of IS on the three trader types: non-commercial 
traders (speculators), commercial traders (hedgers) and non-reportable traders (small traders). 
The unrestricted model [1] includes all the three trader types as explanatory variables while the 
restricted models [2, 3 and 4] include two of the three trader type variables. In model [1], the 
logarithm of non-commercial traders is statistically significant at 5% level of significance and 
logarithm of commercial trader type is significant at 10% level of significant. The coefficient of 
non-reportable traders is not significant indicating that small traders have small and insignificant 
impact on the regular futures information share. The slope coefficient of non-commercial traders 
is higher than that of the commercial traders indicating that the IS of regular futures can be better 
explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers; specifically a 1% increase in 
the trader type position of the non-commercial traders leads to an increase in the IS by 3.874%. 
In the restricted models, the coefficient of non-commercial traders is positive and significant at 
5% level of significance, whereas the coefficient of commercial traders is positive but 
insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that speculator‟s trades have on average more 
information content.  
 
4.2.   Common Factor Component Weight Approach  
 
            Let tp  be a (n x 1) vector of I(1) price series for the same underlying security in n 
markets. Each price series is non-stationary and correlated with h (h = n-1) cointergating 
relations. The Granger representation theorem shows that the VAR(p) with cointergating 
variables can be written in its error correction form 
tptptttt pspspsBzp   112211
*
1 .......  
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            Stock and Watson (1988) show that the price vector can be decomposed into a permanent 
and transitory component. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) proposed an alternative decomposition 
of tp where the permanent component will be a function of the current values of tp . The vector 
of price tp is decomposed as follows: 
ttt FfFp 21   
where tf  is the common long memory component and t  is the stationary component. Two 
conditions are imposed; first, tf is an exact linear function of the current values of tp  and 
second, the transitory component t  has no permanent effect on tp .  
 
            These assumptions make it possible to identify the common factor and also make the 
common efficient price tf observable. The Gonzalo Granger approach defines the permanent 
component of the vector of prices tp as a linear combination of the current values of the price 
vector, where linear combination is given by the structure of the A. Given the nature of the 
Gonzalo Granger decomposition and the following result: 
tt pAf
'  
the A matrix becomes a natural measure of the contribution to price discovery of market i. The 
higher the weight, the larger the contribution of the market to information.     
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TABLE 5: Information share: Gonzalo – Granger weights 
 
The table represents robustness check of information share for the sample period from January 
2010 to December 2010. Panel A describes one second sampling mean, median and standard 
deviation estimates relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and e-mini futures 
EUR/USD contract Panel B shows weekly sampling mean median and standard deviation 
estimates for 52 weeks. Information shares are computed from the vector error correction model 
(VECM) suggested by Gonzalo – Granger (1995). 
 
 
Panel A 
 
                    Regular contract price                     E-mini contract price 
         
    
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound   
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound 
                  
Mean 
 
0.298 0.597 0.896 
 
0.125 0.312 0.498 
Median 
 
0.421 0.682 0.942 
 
0.243 0.393 0.543 
SD 0.201 0.279 0.356   0.134 0.194 0.253 
 
Panel B 
                    Regular contract price                     E-mini contract price 
         
    
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound   
Lower 
Bound Midpoint 
Upper 
bound 
                  
Mean 
 
0.374 0.634 0.893 
 
0.163 0.343 0.523 
Median 
 
0.465 0.711 0.956 
 
0.294 0.402 0.509 
SD 0.198 0.266 0.334   0.129 0.171 0.213 
 
            Table 5 shows the estimated price discovery contributions of the two markets; regular 
and e-mini EUR/USD futures markets for both one second and weekly sampling intervals. In 
Panel A, the common factor weights for one second interval, estimated jointly over all days by 
the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) model is 59.7% for regular futures and 31.2% for e-mini 
futures. Panel B presents weekly sampling interval and show that common factor weights for 
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regular futures and e-mini futures is 63.4% and 34.3% respectively. This is similar to our initial 
findings that the regular futures may better capture the IS as compared to e-mini futures. 
 
TABLE 6: Effects of trader’s positions on information share using Gonzalo – Granger 
(1995)   
 
The table represents robustness check for the effects of trader‟s positions on information share 
(IS) where information share of the regular futures is the dependent variable calculated using the 
weekly sampling interval on every Tuesday and is measured by the Gonzalo – Granger (1995) 
approach. Independent variables are non commercial, commercial and non-reportable trader type 
position. Ln denotes logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The standard errors of 
the estimates are computed based on the procedure of Newey-West (1987) to adjust for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression errors. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression model is 
specified as follows: 
 
             ___________________________________________________________________ 
                           Dependent variable: the relative contribution to price discovery 
             ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         
  
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
                  
Variable   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
         Constant 
 
   3.635*** 
 
  4.722*** 
 
3.635*** 
 
  3.983*** 
  
  (0.000) 
 
   (0.000) 
 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Non-com 
 
 2.836** 
 
      ---- 
 
1.764** 
 
2.424** 
  
  (0.012) 
   
(0.027) 
 
(0.047) 
Com 
 
    0.236* 
 
   -2.873 
 
---- 
 
1.042* 
  
  (0.085) 
 
   (0.927) 
   
(0.057) 
Non-rep 
 
    2.732 
 
   -2.763 
 
2.872 
 
---- 
  
  (0.873) 
 
   (0.765) 
 
(0.524) 
  
         Adjusted R 2  
 
0.406 
 
0.103 
 
0.195 
 
0.293 
Nos   52   52   52   52 
 
            Table 6 reports the regression results of IS calculated using the Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995) method on the three trader types; non-commercial traders (speculators), commercial 
traders (hedgers) and non-reportable traders (small traders). Here I find that the coefficient of 
  )Reln()ln()ln()]1/(ln[ 321 pNonComNonComcISIS kk
)]1/(ln[ kk ISIS 
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non-commercial traders is positive and significant at 5% level of significance, indicating that a 
1% increase in the non-commercial trader type position will lead to a 2.84% increase in IS value 
of the regular futures contracts. The coefficient of commercial traders is also positive but not 
significant collaborating with the finding that that the IS of regular futures can be better 
explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers. 
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5.   CONCLUSION 
 
            This study investigates the relative contribution by the regular futures market and e-mini 
futures market to price discovery in EURO/USD futures market using high frequency data in 
2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the information share 
approach of Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The primary results indicate 
that regular futures market dominates price discovery visa vie e-mini futures market. On average, 
regular futures contributes 66.5% to price discovery in the EURO/USD futures market. 
 
This study also studies the relationship between positioning of different types of participants 
(hedgers and speculators) and IS. Both restricted and unrestricted regressions are considered. I 
find a positive significant relationship between IS and the non-commercial (speculators) trader 
position and between IS and commercial (hedgers) trader position. The slope coefficient of non-
commercial trader type is higher relative to the commercial trader type indicating that the IS of 
regular futures can be better explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers.  
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APPENDIX “A” 
VARIABLES DISCRIPTION 
Open Interest Open interest is the total of all futures and/or option contracts entered 
into and not yet offset by a transaction, by delivery, by exercise, etc. The 
aggregate of all long open interest is equal to the aggregate of all short 
open interest. 
Open interest held or controlled by a trader is referred to as that trader's 
position. For the COT Futures-and-Options-Combined report, option 
open interest and traders' option positions are computed on a futures-
equivalent basis using delta factors supplied by the exchanges. Long-call 
and short-put open interest are converted to long futures-equivalent open 
interest. Likewise, short-call and long-put open interest are converted to 
short futures-equivalent open interest. For example, a trader holding a 
long put position of 500 contracts with a delta factor of 0.50 is 
considered to be holding a short futures-equivalent position of 250 
contracts. A trader's long and short futures-equivalent positions are 
added to the trader's long and short futures positions to give "combined-
long" and "combined-short" positions. Open interest, as reported to the 
Commission and as used in the COT report, does not include open 
futures contracts against which notices of deliveries have been stopped 
by a trader or issued by the clearing organization of an exchange 
Reportable Positions Clearing members, futures commission merchants, and foreign brokers 
(collectively called reporting firms) file daily reports with the 
Commission. Those reports show the futures and option positions of 
traders that hold positions above specific reporting levels set by CFTC 
regulations. If, at the daily market close, a reporting firm has a trader 
with a position at or above the Commission‟s reporting level in any 
single futures month or option expiration, it reports that trader‟s entire 
position in all futures and options expiration months in that commodity, 
regardless of size. The aggregate of all traders‟ positions reported to the 
Commission usually represents 70 to 90 percent of the total open 
interest in any given market. From time to time, the Commission will 
raise or lower the reporting levels in specific markets to strike a balance 
between collecting sufficient information to oversee the markets and 
minimizing the reporting burden on the futures industry. 
Commercial and 
Non-commercial 
Traders 
When an individual reportable trader is identified to the Commission, 
the trader is classified either as "commercial" or "non-commercial." All 
of a trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as 
commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular 
commodity for hedging as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 CFR 
1.3(z). A trading entity generally gets classified as a "commercial" 
trader by filing a statement with the Commission, on CFTC Form 40: 
Statement of Reporting Trader, that it is commercially "...engaged in 
business activities hedged by the use of the futures or option markets." 
To ensure that traders are classified with accuracy and consistency, 
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Commission staff may exercise judgment in re-classifying a trader if it 
has additional information about the trader‟s use of the markets. A trader 
may be classified as a commercial trader in some commodities and as a 
non-commercial trader in other commodities. A single trading entity 
cannot be classified as both a commercial and non-commercial trader in 
the same commodity. Nonetheless, a multi-functional organization that 
has more than one trading entity may have each trading entity classified 
separately in a commodity. For example, a financial organization trading 
in financial futures may have a banking entity whose positions are 
classified as commercial and have a separate money-management entity 
whose positions are classified as non-commercial. 
Non-reportable 
Positions 
The long and short open interest shown as "Non-reportable Positions" is 
derived by subtracting total long and short "Reportable Positions" from 
the total open interest. Accordingly, for "Non-reportable Positions," the 
number of traders involved and the commercial/non-commercial 
classification of each trader are unknown 
Spreading For the futures-only report, spreading measures the extent to which each 
non-commercial trader holds equal long and short futures positions. For 
the options-and-futures-combined report, spreading measures the extent 
to which each non-commercial trader holds equal combined-long and 
combined-short positions. For example, if a non-commercial trader in 
Eurodollar futures holds 2,000 long contracts and 1,500 short contracts, 
500 contracts will appear in the "Long" category and 1,500 contracts 
will appear in the "Spreading" category. These figures do not include 
intermarket spreading, such as spreading Eurodollar futures against 
Treasury Note futures. Also see the "Old and Other Futures" section, 
below. 
Changes in 
Commitments from 
Previous Reports 
Changes represent the differences between the data for the current report 
date and the data published in the previous report. 
Percent of Open 
Interest 
Percents are calculated against the total open interest for the futures-only 
report and against the total futures-equivalent open interest for the 
options-and-futures-combined report. Percents less than 0.05 are shown 
as 0.0; and because of rounding, percents may not total 100% 
Number of Traders To determine the total number of reportable traders in a market, a trader 
is counted only once whether or not the trader appears in more than one 
category (non-commercial traders may be long or short only and may be 
spreading; commercial traders may be long and short). To determine the 
number of traders in each category, however, a trader is counted in each 
category in which the trader holds a position. The sum of the numbers of 
traders in each category, therefore, will often exceed the number of 
traders in that market 
Old and Other 
Futures 
For selected commodities where there is a well-defined marketing 
season or crop year, the COT data are broken down by "old" and "other" 
crop years. The "Major Markets for Which the COT Data Is Shown by 
Crop Year" table (shown below) lists those commodities and the first 
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and last futures of the marketing season or crop year. In order not to 
disclose positions in a single future near its expiration, on the first 
business day of the month of the last future in an "old" crop year, the 
data for that last future is combined with the data for the next crop year 
and is shown as "old" crop futures. An example is CBOT wheat, where 
the first month of the crop year is July and the last month of the prior 
crop year is May. On May 3, 2004, positions in the May 2004 futures 
month were aggregated with positions in the July 2004 through May 
2005 futures months and shown as "old" crop futures. Positions in all 
subsequent wheat futures months were shown as "other." 
For the "old" and "other" figures, spreading is calculated for equal long 
and short positions within a crop year. If a non-commercial trader holds 
a long position in an "old" crop-year future and an equal short position 
in an "other" crop-year future, the long position will be classified as 
"long-only" in the "old" crop year and the short position will be 
classified as "short-only" in the "other" crop year. In this example, in the 
"all" category, which considers each trader's positions without regard to 
crop year, that trader's positions will be classified as "spreading." For 
this reason, summing the "old" and "other" figures for long-only, for 
short-only, or for spreading will not necessarily equal the corresponding 
figure shown for "all" futures. Any differences result from traders that 
spread from an "old" crop-year future to an "other" crop-year future 
Concentration Ratios  The report shows the percents of open interest held by the largest four 
and eight reportable traders, without regard to whether they are 
classified as commercial or non-commercial. The concentration ratios 
are shown with trader positions computed on a gross long and gross 
short basis and on a net long or net short basis. The "Net Position" ratios 
are computed after offsetting each trader‟s equal long and short 
positions. A reportable trader with relatively large, balanced long and 
short positions in a single market, therefore, may be among the four and 
eight largest traders in both the gross long and gross short categories, 
but will probably not be included among the four and eight largest 
traders on a net basis 
 
SOURCE – U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) explanatory notes 
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